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Abstract
Background: Some island nations have explicit components of their influenza pandemic plans for
providing travel warnings and restricting incoming travellers. But the potential value of such
restrictions has not been quantified.
Methods: We developed a probabilistic model and used parameters from a published model (i.e.,
InfluSim) and travel data from Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs).
Results: The results indicate that of the 17 PICTs with travel data, only six would be likely to
escape a major pandemic with a viral strain of relatively low contagiousness (i.e., for R0 = 1.5) even
when imposing very tight travel volume reductions of 99% throughout the course of the pandemic.
For a more contagious viral strain (R0 = 2.25) only five PICTs would have a probability of over 50%
to escape. The total number of travellers during the pandemic must not exceed 115 (for R0 = 3.0)
or 380 (for R0 = 1.5) if a PICT aims to keep the probability of pandemic arrival below 50%.
Conclusion: These results suggest that relatively few island nations could successfully rely on
intensive travel volume restrictions alone to avoid the arrival of pandemic influenza (or subsequent
waves). Therefore most island nations may need to plan for multiple additional interventions (e.g.,
screening and quarantine) to raise the probability of remaining pandemic free or achieving
substantial delay in pandemic arrival.
Background
There were large (voluntary) reductions of travel volumes
associated with the global spread of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) [1]. There have also been media
reports of reduced tourist flows associated with the swine-
origin (H1N1) influenza pandemic during 2009 (particu-
larly for Mexico). Such a phenomenon may reoccur with
the emergence of more virulent waves of the current pan-
demic or if new strains of pandemic influenza emerge.
In addition to voluntary changes in travel volumes, gov-
ernments may also impose legal restrictions on travel and
use exit and entry screening. Indeed, some island nations
have explicit components of their influenza pandemic
plans for providing travel warnings and restricting incom-
ing travellers e.g., New Zealand [2] and all four Pacific
Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) with published
plans that were examined in a recent review [3]. Further-
more, some modelling work suggests that international
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air travel restrictions may contribute to delaying the glo-
bal spread of a pandemic [4].
While a World Health Organization Writing Group [5]
recognised that islands have achieved border control suc-
cesses with pandemic influenza in the past, a more recent
review cited expert opinion against the use of mandatory
travel restrictions for pandemic influenza control [6].
However this review appeared to be in the context of large
countries and did not consider islands (especially low-
income island nations which cannot necessarily afford
some other control options). Therefore, to better guide
the use of these interventions, we aimed to quantify the
potential impact of travel volume reductions to prevent
(or at least delay) the entry of pandemic influenza into
small Pacific island nations.
Methods
Model of a global pandemic and assumptions
We considered that a global influenza pandemic would
spread around the world via aircraft travel and have an
average reproduction number (R0) in the range of 1.5 to
3.0 (with a mid-range value of 2.25). The pandemic was
assumed to be in the form of a single pandemic wave that
would end within a year.
For this pandemic scenario, we developed a probabilistic
mathematical model that is described in detail in the
Technical Appendix (Additional file 1) along with a
numerical example for one island nation. An interactive
software application that was based on this model was
also developed and is freely available online http://
www.influsim.info/software/escaval[7].
The key parameter calculated was the "island escape prob-
ability" which was the probability that an island nation
would avoid an outbreak of pandemic influenza for the
full course of the global pandemic. The values of the input
parameters used in our model for the global pandemic
were based on the published model InfluSim [8] (with ver-
sion 2.1, April 2008, being freely downloadable). In addi-
tion, we made the two other assumptions to increase
model realism:
￿ Only 50% of "moderately sick" cases (as defined in
[8]) were assumed to be well enough to travel.
￿ Only 10% of "severely sick" cases (as defined in [8])
were assumed to be well enough to travel.
Such assumptions are likely to be very conservative as they
assume no exit screening by pandemic-affected nations.
We also assumed that no other pandemic influenza con-
trol measures would be utilized in the island nations. That
is, no entry screening; no provision of antivirals to travel-
lers; no quarantine; and no use of pre-pandemic vaccine
or of a vaccine that had been developed after the emer-
gence of the new pandemic strain.
Assumptions on travel reductions
We assumed that voluntary travel reductions (averaged
over the course of the pandemic) might be similar to
those experienced during SARS for travel between Hong
Kong and the United States at 79% [9]. Much higher levels
of travel volume reduction (i.e., 99%) were assumed to
relate to restrictions imposed by governments of island
nations and to reflect essential diplomatic and emergency
travel only (or complete "official" border closure with
some leakage attributable to illegal yacht movements and
private plane use).
Travel data
We collected travel volume data for all the PICTs that
were: (i) members of the Secretariat of the Pacific Com-
munity (SPC); (ii) which had a population of under one
million (which excluded Papua New Guinea); and (iii)
which had an airport (i.e., which excluded Tokelau and
Pitcairn Island). Data were from the SPC website [10] and
from its links to the websites of the Statistics Depart-
ments/Ministries of the PICTs (where these existed).
Calculating the escape probability
Using these data, we expect that a given number of
infected individuals enter the island during the global
pandemic. Depending on their course of disease and on
the remaining time of contagiousness, the expected
number of secondary cases per index case varies, and so
does the probability that the index case triggers a major
outbreak on the island. We combine all possible events,
taking into consideration their individual probabilities, to
calculate the probability that an island will either experi-
ence a major outbreak or ultimately escape the pandemic.
Our calculations assume that travel restrictions are per-
formed from the very beginning of a pandemic until the
end or until the failure to prevent introduction becomes
evident.
Results
The results (Table 1) indicate that for the 17 PICTs with
travel data, only six would be likely to avoid introduction
of pandemic influenza, even if the pandemic strain was of
relatively low contagiousness (i.e., for R0 = 1.5) and if very
tight travel reductions of 99% were applied throughout
the course of the global pandemic (Table 1). For more
severe pandemics (R0 = 2.25 or higher), only four to five
PICTs would have more than 50% probability of escap-
ing. Only one country (Tuvalu) was considered to have a
high chance of escaping a relatively "mild" pandemic by
relying on voluntary travel volume reductions alone (i.e.,
a 79% reduction level).BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:160 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/160
Page 3 of 5
(page number not for citation purposes)
Two of the 19 PICTs had no travel data and for the others
much of the data were suboptimal in that they did not
always include numbers of returning citizens, and often
only the arrivals by air (i.e., ignoring arrivals by sea; for
details, see Table 1).
Figure 1 shows how the island escape probability depends
on the total number of travellers arriving on a PICT during
the course of the global pandemic. For R0 = 1.5, the critical
number of travellers must not exceed 380, if the PICT
aims to have an escape probability above 50%. For R0 =
2.25 and R0 = 3.0, these critical values are 155 and 115
travellers respectively.
Severely or moderately sick travellers were assumed to
have a reduced probability of travel. Because of this, and
because of the large fraction of individuals who remain
asymptomatic througout the course of their infection,
nearly 75% of infected visitors do not show any symp-
toms upon arrival on a PICT. This value only depends on
the natural history of the disease and on the propensity of
sick people to travel, but it is independent on R0 (see the
Technical Appendix for more details).
Discussion
Main findings and interpretation
This analysis suggests that only a few PICTs might be
expected to avoid pandemic influenza by relying on
extremely rigorous travel volume reductions alone. Con-
sequently, most PICTs need to consider multiple addi-
tional options in their pandemic planning (especially for
pandemics with high case fatality ratios). These measures
might include: entry screening using health question-
naires and use of rapid diagnostic tests; routine facility
Table 1: Probability of small islands in the South Pacific escaping a global influenza pandemic (for different values of R0 and different 
travel volume reductions for arriving travellers). 
Country 
(year for traveler arrival data)
Total annual traveler arrivals Island escape probability for global influenza pandemic
99% travel reduction 79% travel reduction
R0 = 1.5 R0 = 2.25 R0 = 3.0 R0 = 1.5 R0 = 2.25 R0 = 3.0
Guam (2007/08) 1,210,600† <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Fiji (2004) 596,084 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Northern Mariana Islands (2004) 589,244* <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
French Polynesia (2006) 221,549* 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Samoa (2007) 196,627‡ 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Vanuatu (2006) 154,101§ 0.06 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Cook Islands (2007) 109,115 0.14 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
New Caledonia (2006) 100,491* 0.16 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Palau (2006) 86,375* 0.21 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
American Samoa (2006) 72,800 0.27 0.04 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Tonga (2003) 63,451¶ 0.32 0.06 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 
(2005)
18,958* 0.71 0.43 0.32 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Solomon Islands (2007) 13,748* 0.78 0.54 0.44 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Marshall Islands (2005) 9173* 0.85 0.66 0.57 0.03 <0.01 <0.01
Kiribati (2006) 4704# 0.92 0.81 0.75 0.17 0.01 <0.01
Niue (2006) 4588** 0.92 0.81 0.76 0.18 0.01 <0.01
Tuvalu (2007) 1130 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.65 0.34 0.24
N a u r u n / a --- ---
Wallis and Futuna n/a - - - - - -
Notes:
The coding of the island escape probability: standard type, <10%; italics, 10 - 50%; bold, > 50%.
* Available data do not include island citizens returning from overseas travel (i.e., non-citizen arrivals only) though the former are usually a small 
proportion of arrivals relative to non-citizens for most PICTs.
† For Guam this figure was extrapolated from arrivals data for October 2007 to February 2008. Includes civilian and armed forces arrivals by air 
(not by sea) and does not include data on returning citizens of Guam.
‡ For Samoa this figure involves an extrapolation of arrivals data for January to July 2007 and includes a figure for returning residents based on the 
assumption that all Samoan citizens who departed returned in the same year (2005 data). These figures include arrivals by sea (4.4% of total visitor 
arrivals).
§For Vanuatu this figure includes day visitors from ships (n = 85,922).
¶For Tonga this figure includes an estimate for returning residents and arrivals by ship and yacht.
# For Kiribati this figure includes an estimate for returning residents based on the assumption that all "I-Kiribati" leaving also return in the same 
year (n = 130 for the most recent year with data i.e., 2002).
** For Niue this figure includes an estimate for returning residents based on the assumption that all "residents not departing permanently" return in 
the same year.
n/a: No data available.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:160 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/160
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quarantine [11] or home quarantine with intensive mon-
itoring; possibly the routine provision of antivirals to
incoming travellers; pre-pandemic vaccination of their
populations (if an appropriate vaccine became available);
enhanced capacity for disease surveillance in the commu-
nity and for rapid outbreak control capacity. As nearly
75% of infected travellers arrive without symptoms, entry
screening based on the travellers' symptom states alone
only slightly improves the escape probability (e.g. it
increases Tonga's escape probability from 32 to 46% for
the R0 = 1.5 scenario with 99% travel reduction) if all
symptomatic travellers are prevented from infecting any-
body.
Our calculations assume that travel reduction remains
constant during the whole period of the global pandemic.
Higher numbers of travellers may temporarily be admit-
ted from regions which are not or only slightly afflicted by
the pandemic, but this strategy may be too difficult to
implement because it would require the travel history of
each arriving traveler to be verified. An alternative to these
interventions is planning for complete border closure
(i.e., practically 100% travel volume reduction) at the first
sign of a global pandemic - a response that some PICTs
used successfully during the 1918/19 influenza pandemic
[12].
Even rigorous travel volume reductions might, however,
be difficult for those PICTs that partially depend on food
imports and other critical imports (e.g., medical supplies).
Nevertheless, some PICTs might be able to facilitate ongo-
ing trade by aircraft and shipping while keeping the crews
of these vessels entirely separated from the local popula-
tion (e.g., with high security unloading facilities where the
crew never actually disembark while their vessel is
unloaded). Others could enhance food self-sufficiency by
increasing fishing and diverting export crops (e.g., coco-
nut oil) for use as food.
Pandemic severity varies greatly with the experience of the
current swine-origin (H1N1) influenza pandemic (at least
to mid-2009) indicating a severity that might even be less
overall than seasonal influenza. Therefore, good data on
severity at the start of a pandemic (or a new pandemic
wave) will help island nations decide if mandated travel
volume reduction is a worthwhile intervention. Key varia-
bles for such early decisions from affected countries (espe-
cially developing countries) are hospitalisation rates and
case fatality ratios.
Also of note that some actions that would assist with
severe travel volume reductions during pandemic influ-
enza might be worthwhile in their own right. One exam-
ple is building infrastructure to improve access to the
Internet and to allow videoconferencing. Diversifying
island economies (to reduce reliance on tourism) may
also cushion island economies against other natural disas-
ters and routine fluctuations in tourism numbers.
Although travel restrictions may not be sufficient to pre-
vent the successful importation of an infection, they
should (at least on average) delay it. Scalia Tomba and
Wallinga [13] demonstrated with a simple mathematical
model that an overall travel reduction by 99% should
delay an epidemic on an island by about three weeks if R0
is approximately 2.
Limitations
This analysis made many simplifying assumptions. It
could potentially be improved by developing a more com-
plex stochastic model that used log-normal or gamma-dis-
tributed sojourn times (rather than the exponential
distributions used here). Such a model would also be able
to provide information on the average time of pandemic
arrival. Improved modelling (including combining addi-
tional border control interventions with travel reduc-
tions) may not only facilitate pandemic planning among
PICTs but also help other island nations (and sub-
national island jurisdictions) in the Caribbean, Southeast
Asia and off the coast of most continents.
Although we considered a range of values of R0, it is con-
ceivable that in a global pandemic the effective R0 would
decline after the first few months of pandemic emergence.
This decline is because many countries around the world
are very likely to adopt social distancing and other control
measures. Possibly after some months, relevant technolo-
gies such as a pandemic strain vaccine might also become
available (and start to be used by those planning to
Probability to escape a major epidemic by number of visitors  arriving on a PICT during the pandemic period Figure 1
Probability to escape a major epidemic by number of 
visitors arriving on a PICT during the pandemic 
period.
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travel). Indeed, arriving travellers might be required to
show a certificate of vaccination with a new pandemic vac-
cine.
The missing and suboptimal nature of some of the travel
data shown in Table 1 is problematic. There is a need for
regional agencies to encourage improved data collection
and publication by PICTs so that studies such as the one
reported here can be undertaken with more realism.
Finally we note that this work has not assessed the value
to policy makers of island nations in presenting "escape
probabilities" in the way that we have. It could be that to
use a mandated travel reduction intervention, policy mak-
ers would need to have indications of much higher rates
of success than thresholds of 50% (as used in Table 1).
They may also need indications of the potential number
of hospitalisations prevented and lives saved before there
is political and popular acceptance of the policy (e.g. as
calculated from case fatality ratios in other countries).
Conclusion
These results suggest that relatively few island nations
could successfully rely on intensive travel volume restric-
tions alone to avoid the arrival of pandemic influenza.
Therefore most island nations will need to plan for multi-
ple additional interventions (e.g., screening and quaran-
tine) to raise the probability of remaining pandemic free.
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